Time Regained Part. II: Epistemological Perspectives
Summary
The problem of transtemporal personal identity delves into the criteria required for the same person to exist at different times. Most responses to this issue rely on a common assumption: identity is an all-or-nothing matter. This assumption is often driven by the idea that personal identity can be known from first-person perspective, leaving no room for indeterminacy. The primary goal of this project is to challenge this assumption by presenting cases where one can reasonably doubt personal identity: cases of extreme longevity and brain fission. These cases pave the way for potential indeterminacy in personal identity and the possibility of possessing (quasi-)memories from experiences lived by non-identical persons.
The second goal of this project is to extend the discussion beyond the question of transtemporal personal identity to examine the role of memory in shaping our beliefs about time generally. The question posed is: “Is memory alone sufficient to explain our ordinary beliefs about time (e.g., the belief that time passes)?”. Contrary to some theories influenced by recent scientific findings, the aim is to demonstrate that while memory plays a crucial role in explanation, it requires the existence of an underlying dynamic reality. This dynamicity, not a priori excluded by certain emerging programs of theoretical physics, is crucial for our understanding of time and identity.
Schedule and milestones
